CCTV and the problem of technological determinism

The human element within a CCTV system is often forgotten or simply ignored. For a number of years much of the research surrounding CCTV was grounded upon technological determinism (Smith, 2004). The CCTV operators are a crucial part of the system however as they ultimately determine where the cameras are focussed or, more specifically, who the cameras are focussed upon. In much of the literature it can be seen that operators have a tendency to be biased when following individuals. Norris and Armstrong (1999:109) found in their study of public space systems that males made up 93% of targeted surveillance, with black individuals being disproportionately over-represented. McCahill’s (2002: 108) study within two shopping malls found that males made up 71% of the targets, with 50% containing people dressed in ‘sub cultural attire’. Furthermore McCahill and Norris (2003: 27) found that 75% of operator targets were male and that people dressed ‘scruffily’ were more likely to be ejected from the shopping centre. The last of the major studies, by Smith (2004), also found criminality to be primarily associated with young males dressed in subcultural attire. As can be seen these findings do differ slightly from one another but there exists a strong correlation between gender, ethnicity, appearance and targeting. Additionally, certain studies found that individuals or groups appearing immobile or without a sense of purpose were also subjected to surveillance (Smith, 2004, Neyland, 2006). It could be argued that a camera system must use all the visual clues available to detect troublesome behaviour. However, Norris and Armstrong (1999) found this crime prevention technique to be ineffective; after 888 hours of targeted surveillance 12 arrests were made. The studies show how CCTV can serve to isolate certain groups of people and become a way of enhancing inequality through the amplification of discrimination (Coleman, 2004, Smith, 2004,). These aspects of CCTV operation, as McCahill and Norris (2003) suggest, show that the legally regulated measures of crime control are not being followed. In its place instead, is a rising operational culture of private and unaccountable justice. This is perceived to be a result of the previously mentioned regeneration strategies, as CCTV is implemented to protect what are ultimately capitalist interests. These findings are not limited to the United Kingdom either as similar results have been found in Norway (Lomell, 2004), France (Martinais and Betin, 2004) and the USA (Shearing and Stenning, 1997). This research does indeed show that surveillance is not neutral but instead based upon subjective perceptions (Lyon, 2007). This is crucial to understanding how control rooms operate as they are highly context dependant.

The individual and cultural factors encountered within each workplace are important as they can shape the everyday operational dynamics of CCTV. A number of studies have shown how organisationally-induced disagreement can reduce a CCTV system’s effectiveness (Norris and Armstrong, 1999, McCahill and Norris, 2003, Smith, 2004). Norris and Armstrong (1999) found that the determining factor behind a rapid and successful deployment was the level of operator integration with control agencies like the police service. They go on to highlight how the inconsistent integration at different sites resulted in fluctuating levels of successful deployment. Internal organisational conflict can be seen in McCahill’s (2002) research, which shows how the cameras were used to monitor and control employees rather than prevent crime. This strategy was weakened and resisted by security staff and workers in the lower strata due to their shared class identity. Smith (2007) argues that this was a result of lower level workers sharing the same pay levels and informal aims rather than the actuarial controlling strategies implemented by management. The implications for conflicting social processes can also be seen in McCahill and Norris’s (2003) work. They found that disagreement between middle management, security officers, and the local police service resulted in strained workplace relations. This ultimately meant that the CCTV system became neglected and rarely used to its potential. These results were echoed in Smith’s (2004) study, but he also found that limited financial gain and the lack of psychological challenges contributed to operator resistance and consequent system dysfunction. The presence of operator ‘war stories’ is also noteworthy as they highlight the presence of long inactive periods interspersed with rare dramatic occurrences. These stories are repeated regularly in order to keep operators entertained during their uneventful shifts (McCahill, 2002).

A slight exception to the majority of results can be found in Helten and Fischer’s (2003) study carried out in Berlin shopping centres. They found that discriminatory targeting was minimal because of the additional organisational tasks operators had to carry out. The operator shifts tended to be spent handling alarms, parking barriers and entry systems instead of targeting certain social groups. Indeed, Smith (2007) highlights how the control room design, ergonomics and multi-tasking environment can have an effect upon how the cameras are used, making it an important area for study. More recent studies have also identified additional influences upon an operators targeting. Smith (ibid: 309) found the operators can, to a certain extent, become controlled themselves. His research shows how the two surveillance ‘subjects’ (watchers and watched) can alter the other’s behaviour instead of observation being a ‘one way street’, passing from operator to target. This is important as it shows the authority empowered to CCTV operators actually fluctuates, flowing back and forth through the medium embodied by camera and monitor.

The importance of cultural and operator resistance cannot be overlooked as it appears to challenge the assumption that CCTV is an impartial and objective system. Resistance from employees can distort the desired implementation of management aims or government strategies. Indeed, it can be seen that suspicion and categories of deviance are socially constructed by the operators themselves. However, there are numerous influences that can alter the ways in which operator perceptions are put into practice. These can be from internal, organisational and environmental factors through to external persuasion from the watched actors themselves. The strength and even number of influences can be seen to differ depending on the site being studied. As McCahill and Norris (2003:44) highlight, CCTV systems have diverse operating procedures, staffing policies and levels of technological sophistication. This ultimately makes generalisations regarding CCTV control rooms problematic. The overarching theories that concern surveillance appear to be dependant upon the levels and forms of resistance encountered within individual control rooms. However, this does mean that further empirical research is needed into a wider variety of sites, focussing on the operational cultures of the control rooms themselves. If it is found that CCTV is being inappropriately used across a broad spectrum of environments, then measures may be needed to re-enforce formal system usage in order to reduce high levels of discrimination, social exclusion, and system misuse.

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